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Surprise Attack:
Crime at Pearl Harbor and Now
In this issue, one of the United States Counsel at the Tokyo War
Crimes Trial examines the legal and historical background of that
trial which took place in Japan following World War II. Judge Robin-
son centers his discussion around the little-known provisions of the
Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, which was signed at
The Hague in 1907. One of the primary purposes of that convention
was to outlaw surprise attack such as that committed by the Japanese
at Pearl Harbor. The first part of Judge Robinson's article appears in
this issue; the second and concluding portion will be published next
month.
by James J. Robinson * Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom of Libya
I
Judgment Day
ON THE AFTERNOON of November
12, 1948, in a stately courtroom at
Tokyo, Japan, an eleven-nation, eleven-
judge court of law was completing a
trial of unique and historic significance
in the progress of the law. The court,
the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, had been conducting the
trial of twenty-five defendants for two
and one-half years, and now, by its
chief judge, the court was delivering
its judgment.
In this court for the first time in
world history former political-military
leaders of a nation were personally
being tried on specific counts for start-
ing wars by illegal surprise attack and
thereby committing crimes including
murder. One of the murder counts was
based on the surprise attack at Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.
The crime of surprise attack, as codi-
fied, defined and prohibited by the
Third Hague Convention of 1907, was
charged as an armed attack commenc-
ing hostilities without a preceding five-
point declaration of war as demanded
by that treaty.
The courtroom scene on this judg-
ment day dramatized the order, the
reason and the ultimate supremacy of
law. The guns and bombs of armed
forces were silent, the international re-
lations of diplomacy were broken, but
the law was carrying on. In that wit-
ness box, five hundred witnesses of
more than twenty nations had testified
to the facts; and at that high bench
nearly two hundred lawyers of twelve
nations had deliberated, with the
judges, on applicable treaties and other
laws. The court was a visible working
partnership in the administration of
justice, a partnership between the peo-
ples and governments of the largest
number of nations ever to ally them-
selves in the creation and in the daily
work of a judicial criminal trial court.
The judgment being delivered this
afternoon would now answer a crucial
question for the anxiously listening
defendants, for the trial lawyers, and
for the four hundred spectators in the
tensely quiet courtroom. The people of
the rest of the world through radio
and news dispatches would likewise
immediately get the court's answer.
The dominant question being answered
was whether the Third Hague Treaty
was in fact a mere scrap of paper, or
whether it actually made surprise at-
tack a crime and made surprise attack-
ers personally punishable as criminals.
The answer as read by the chief
judge was clear. The judgment upheld
Hague III as ruling law and as a con-
tributing source of criminal penalties
for convicted surprise attackers.
Nevertheless, throughout the world
today, only a decade after that trial
and judgment, the problem of prevent-
ing surprise attack continues to alarm
peoples and nations. The'problem in its
chief legal aspect today may be stated
as follows:
As a means toward deterring or pre-
venting future criminal surprise attacks
such as Pearl Harbor magnified into
nuclear world-wide annihilation of hu-
man life and civilization, can the peo-
ple of many or all nations succeed in
organizing jointly, their allied power
into well-known agencies of the law
such as criminal courts and police, and
into every-day working technologies of
the law such as criminal codes, trials
and law enforcing procedures?
It is the purpose of this paper to
show that Hague III and the Tokyo
trial in fact indicate not only an affirm-
ative answer to this question but also
Views stated in this article are not presented
as the views of any government or of an official
or department of any government. The view-
point is that of a lawyer working in and with
courts of law. Statements from public records
and other sources are authenticated by citations
in text or in notes.
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specific procedures and legal prece-
dents for appropriate joint action. Such
organized action can serve not only to
prevent surprise attack but also to en-
join direct and indirect aggression, to
control disarmament and to strengthen
the United Nations.
The approach taken in this paper is
that of any experienced criminal law
lawyer or judge of any nation. As a
general principle he seeks to follow
the maxim of the ancient Roman law-
yer and judge, namely: Via trita via
tuta, the well-worn road is the safe
road. He asks the basic preliminary
questions: What law, if any, has been
violated? What court, if any, has juris-
diction? What sovereign nation or na-
tions, if any, give legal authority and
effectiveness to the law, to the court
and to the judgment? And what public
interests, if any, are served by a prose-
cution or conviction?
The foregoing questions will now be
considered as they relate to Hague III,
to the Tokyo trial and to the present




Hague Convention III of 1907
The Convention Relative to the Open-
ing of Hostilities was signed as the
Third Convention of the Second Inter-
national Peace Conference, held at The
Hague, Netherlands, in 1907.1 Forty-
seven nations have become parties to
the treaty, which will here be called
for brevity Hague 111. Among the
parties are Japan, and the eleven coun-
tries which joined in 1946-48 in prose-
cuting certain Japanese individuals for
violating the treaty and other laws.
These countries were Australia, Can-
ada, China, France, Great Britain,
India, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
the Philippines, the Soviet Union and
the United States. 2 The treaty was
signed on October 18, 1907, by forty-
two nations, of which twenty-five, in-
cluding the principal powers, ratified.3
There have been adherences by six
nations. Sixteen nations have recog-
nized that the treaty is binding on them
by virtue of other treaties or of acts
such as earlier ratification by Great
Britain, France, The Netherlands or the
United States.4
Russia ratified Hague Ill in 1909;
the U.S.S.R. has recognized it as a
binding treaty establishing legal rights
and obligations of the Soviet Union.-"
In 1941, the U.S.S.R. protested against
the surprise attack on the U.S.S.R. by
Germany in violation of Hague 111.6
And in 1946-48 [te Soviet Government
upheld Hague III by full participation
in the court, indictment and trial at
Tokyo. The judgment held the Soviet
Union and the ten other participating
nations to be parties to the treaty.
Germany signed the treaty in 1907 and
ratified it. The latest ratification was
by Brazil in 1914. The latest adherence
was by Ethiopia in August, 1935, a
few weeks before Mussolini attacked
Ethiopia without declaration of war.7
Italy, however, after signature in 1907
had not ratified and therefore did not
become a party to the treaty. Musso-
lini's invasion of Ethiopia, therefore,
was not a violation of Hague lII. s
The treaty is brief and simple. 9 Its
essence is stated in the first article in
only thirty-six words, as follows:
The Contracting Powers recognize that
hostilities between themselves must not
commence without a previous and ex-
plicit warning, in the form either of a
reasoned declaration of war or of an
ultimatum with conditional declaration
of war.
Of the foregoing provisions, those
which are applicable to the surprise
attack at Pearl Harbor may be reduced
to the following nineteen words (with
numerals placed before the five key
1. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CON-
FERESNCE, Translation of Official Texts, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace,1 James
Brown Scott, Director, THE CONFERENCE OF 1907
618 (1920). The list of "States which have be-
come parties" is given in TREATIES IN FORCE,
Department of State Publication 6427 (1956)
page 217 (see note 3 below) as follows: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Can-
ada, Ceylon, China, Denmark, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Guate-
mala, Haiti, Hungary. India, Ireland. Japan,
Liberia, Laos, Luxembourg, Mexico. The Neth-
eslsnds, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Thailand, the Union of South Africa, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom, the United States. Other states which
have become parties according to a U. S. State
Department supplement are: Burma, Cambodia,
Iceland, Indonesia and Vietnam.
2. TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS. Docu-
ments, Department of State Publication 2613
(1946).
3. (a) TREATIES IN FORCE, a List of Treaties
and Other International Agreements of
the United States, October 31, 1956. Com-
piled by Treaty Affairs Staff, Office of the
words which specify the five required
conditions or circumstances) :
•.. hostilities ... must not commence
without a (1) previous and (2) ex-
plicit (3) warning, in the form . . .
of a (4) reasoned (5) declaration of
war . . .
The ultimatum clause of the treaty
does not require discussion here be-
cause it was not involved in the Pearl
Harbor attack nor in the Tokyo trial.
The Japanese, however, in 1914 had
used the ultimatum clause in declaring
war on Germany when surprise was not
needed.
There is also a provision for notifi-
cation to neutral powers of a state of
war (Article 2). The convention takes
effect in case of war between two or
more contracting powers (Article 3).
Additional states may become parties
to the treaty by formal notification to
The Netherlands Government; a simple
step which every state not yet a party
should consider taking. If one of the
contracting powers wishes to with-
draw, it shall notify its denunciation
to The Netherlands Government, to be
effective one year after receipt (Article
7). This latter provision appears to be
the only provision for repeal or for
release of a party from the treaty. The
international court at Tokyo in 1946-
48 recognized the treaty to he in force
and not superseded, obsolete, denounced
nor repealed.10 No pertinent change -
in its legal status has occurred since
1948.
The treaty, as stated in the judgment
Legal Adviser, Department of State. De-
partment of State Publication 6427 (1956)
page 217. Also
(b) Treaty Affairs Staff records of Hague
Convention III of 1907 (rewritten Novem-
ber 8. 1949 H J Z; 1955 supplements and
older records) giving Signatures, Ratifi-
cations, Adherences and Recognitions. Sce
also note 1. The statistics and nares are
subject to slight variations from time to
time due for example to changes in name
or political status of nations.
4. See note 3 (b).
5. Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs of the U.S.S.R. to Embassy of The Nether-
lands, Moscow, dated Moscow, March 7, 1955; a
copy in Treaty Affairs records, note 3 (b). And
see notes 6 and 11 infra.
6. See complaint of Molotoff, NEw YoRm
TIMES, June 23, 1941; 3 Hyde, INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 1945) 1696.
7. See note 3 (b).
8. Statements and assumptions to the con-
trary are numerous but appear to be erroneous.
For example, see Fenwick, ISSTEDINATIONAL LAW
(3d ed. 1948) 553.
9. For full text of treaty, see note 1, first
citation.
10. Judgment, I.M.T.F.E., pages 12, 84, 520.
974 American Bar Association Journal
Surprise Attack
James J. Robinson is a member of
the Indiana and the District of
Columbia Bars and a former Chair-
man of the Section of Criminal Law
of the American Bar Association.
He received his A.B. from Indiana
University in 1914, his LL.B. from
Harvard in 1919, and his S.J.D. from
the same school in 1930. A former
member and reporter of the U. S.
Supreme Court Advisory Commit-
tee on Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, he was U. S. counsel and
naval legal officer in charge of the
Pearl Harbor phase and other parts
of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. He
has been a member of the Libyan
court since 1954.
of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, was binding upon
Japan at all times relevant to the
charges there considered, and likewise
upon all other nations concerned in the
trial." Japan had been bound by the
treaty since ratifying it, with the Em-
peror promulgating it and in effect
thereby ordering all Japanese individ-
uals to respect and obey it, in Deceni-
ber, 1911, thirty years before the
Japanese defendants caused the sur-
prise attack to be made at Pearl Har-
bor. 12 It is useful and appropriate to
illustrate the five requirements of the
treaty by observing how each of them
was violated by the militarist-political
leaders of Japan in their commence-
ment of hostilities on December 7 and
8, 1941, at Pearl Harbor and at the
other places listed in the judgment.
The investigation, indictment and
trial served to clear the innocent as
well as to convict the guilty. The term
"militarist-political leaders" of Japan
was used to refer to those few Japanese
whom the International Tribunal de-
scribed as "militarist conspirators". 1 3
They were leaders who, in the judg-
ment of the court, in or prior to 1941
had taken totalitarian control of the
Japanese armed forces, civil govern-
ment and people. They had complete
official and personal responsibility for
the violation of Hague III.
Even among the defendants in the
Tokyo trial nut all shared in the re-
sponsibility for the Pearl larbor at-
tack. Foreign Minister Togo, for ex-
ample, showed by his testimony, and
by his recent book, The Cause of Japan,
that he "fought" the Navy and Army
high command in their demand for a
surprise attack, a type of attack which
he called "irresponsible" and without
"legitimacy". 14 He considered the sur-
prise attack also impractical as a
means of correcting the injustices which
he believed that other nations had done
to Japan.
The Emperor of Japan, according to
testimony at the trial, directed that the
commencement of hostilities not be
made by surprise. Admiral Shimada
testified on cross-examination by the
writer that the Emperor had told him,
as Navy Minister, and Admiral Nagano,
as Chief of the Naval General Staff,
that the legal warning must be given
prior to any attack on It United
States. 15 Only a few military leaders
knew that surprise attack was to be
used.16 Leading Japanese lawyers are
reported to have advised the Japarese
Govermnent and Navy thai surprise at-
tack would violate Hague 1II. Japanese
and Nisei residents at Pearl Harbor
committed no acts of hostility or sabo-
tage. 17 Many of the Japanese people in
Japan and elsewhere were shocked by
the attack, deplored its violation of
treaty and other laws and of bushido
(honorable warrior) principles, and
foresaw its suicidal consequences for
their country.
The basic requirement of Hague III
is provision number (5) as listed
above, namely, that the attacking na-
tion must make a declaration of war.
The declaration of course is not re-
quired to disclose the place at which
the first attack will be made.
The trial clearly exposed the mis-
leading confusion that has been raised
on this point of whether Japan ever
made or tried to make a legal declara-
tion of war. The Japanese Ambassadors
at Washington delivered to Secretary
Hull on December 7, 1941, a "note"
terminating the diplomatic talks. This
note had no resemblance to a Hague
III declaration of war. The Japanese
themselves recognized in effect that this
paper was not a declaration of war be-
cause they prepared a declaration of
war after the attack. It was received
by the U. S. Government in Washing-
ton sixty-six hours after the attack.'
The note terminating the diplomatic
talks has nevertheless often been called
by Japanese defense sources a "decla-
ration of war". Many unfortunate ex-
amples of this erroneous statement are
found in the record of the trial and in
Japanese writings about the trial' 91
Foreign Minister Togo testified that
Admiral Nagano and other Navy lead-
ers tried to get him not to send even
that "note", leaving the diplomatic
talks to continue treacherously during
the attack. Togo testified also that Ad-
miral Shimada and Admiral Nagano
later during the Tokyo trial "warned"
him not to disclose these facts in his
testimony (Transcript, page 35,538);
and Shimada admitted on the witness
stand that he and Nagano had "re-
quested" Togo not to testify to these
facts (Transcript, page 37,031).
The declaration of war required by
Hague III must not only exist but it
must comply with the four other re-
quirements stated above. It must be
(1) a "previous" warning declaration
of war, delivered prior to the com-
mencement of hostilities. Japanese de-
It. lbid.
12. See notes 3 (b) and 11.
13. Judgment, I.M.T.F.E., pages 1, 139, also
15, 84, 520 passimt.
14. Togo, THE CAUS E OF JAPAN (1956) 198, 199,
215.
15. Transcript. !.M.T.F.E., pages 34, 704-713.
16. Togo, op. cit., page 397; and Transcript,
passim.
17. No evidence of sabotage by residents of
Japanese blood at Pearl Harbor was introduced
in the trial and no evidence was or is known by
the writer to exist. Frequent statements that
there was no sabotage have been accepted with-
out challenge. See, for example, Lord, DAY OF
INFAmY (1957) 210.
18. Transcript, I.M.T.F.E., pages 11, 236-T.
19. See Admiral Fukudome, Hawaii Opera-
tion, 81 U. S. NAVAL INSrITUE PaOCrsEDITqS (De-
cember, 1955) 1323-1324.
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Signal Corps, X.S. Army
Admiral Richardson (far right) testifying at the Tokyo trials. The
author is seated at the counsel table in the center foreground (back to
camera on the left). The American defense counsel is at the lectern.
fense sources have declared that the
required previous declaration of war
may legally be made "only one-half
second" previous to commencing hos-
tilities. 20 Such assertions attempt to
change the legislative wording, inten-
tion and effect of Hague III. A chief
draftsman of Hague III, Renault, of
France, said that such a "warning"
would be "formalistic" and "useless".
2 1
It would also be an impossibility. Both
the wording and also the legislative
history and background of Hague II,
as described later, show that the state-
ment cannot be legally supported.
All statements about the required
length of the warning period between
declaration of war and attack are ir-
relevant so far as the Pearl Harbor
attack is concerned because no pre-
vious declaration of war whatever was
given.
Surprise attack of the Pearl Harbor
type was defended at the trial as
though it were a normal, legal, success-
ful and honorable naval operation.
An American defense lawyer, experi-
enced in American criminal trial tech-
nique, in cross-examining a prosecu-
tion witness, Admiral J. 0. Richard-
son, asked the Admiral whether sur-
prise attack is not a "normal" military
operation, which the United States it-
self would use as needed. The defense
lawyer was confusing the term "sur-
prise attack" in its relevant criminal
law meaning with its irrelevant opera-
tional meaning, that is, an unexpected
attack made in due course of legal war-
fare. This confusion disregards the
caution given by international law
authorities. As Hershey points out,
"the surprise of a nation must not be
confounded with that of an army or
fleet". 22 It is the surprise of a nation,
not of military and naval forces, that
Hague III primarily forbids.
Admiral Richardson, who had made
a special Naval War College study of
the Japanese surprise attack policy in
and since 1904, replied to the defense
lawyer's question by stating that the
Pearl Harbor attack plan of commenc-
ing a war by surprise attack was quite
"normal" for Japan but that such a
plan would be wholly abnormal for the
United States. 23
The court in its judgment character-
ized as "unprincipled" the attackers
who reduce the warning time too
much. 24 On the proper interpretation
of the words "previous" and "warn-
ing", however, the court appears to
disregard the fact, as shown later in
this paper, that the framers of the
treaty at Ghent and at The Hague in-
dicated in effect that the warning
period, while not stated in hours, must
be a reasonable period under all of the
circumstances of the particular situa-
tion. That general standard of "reason-
ableness" is well recognized in law.
The requirement of "previous warn-
ing", the treaty draftsmen declared,
would otherwise be "evaded" and be-
come "illusory". 2 5 The court elsewhere
in its judgment indicated that under
Hague III the interval between decla-
ration of war and the attack should be
at least sufficient to allow "transmission
of the warning [that war had been
declared] to the armed forces in out.
lying territories and to permit them to
put themselves in a state of defense-
or they may be shot down without a
chance to defend themselves",26 Japa-
nese Foreign Minister Togo appears to
have supported this same interpretation
in his courageous but losing "fight" to
make the Japanese high command obey
Hague ll1.27
The judgment shows that the first
and only declaration of war that was
received by the United States Govern-
ment from the Japanese Government
was a merely formal declaration, stat-
ing no substantial reasons. This state-
ment, the Japanese so-called declara-
tion of war, was received on December
10, 1941.28 Against Great Britain, no
previous declaration of war was even
claimed by the Japanese to have been
attempted. 29 Prime Minister Churchill,
in his brief letter notifying the Japa-
nese Ambassador on December 8, 1941,
that the United Kingdom was declaring
war on Japan, cited and quoted Hague
Convention 1II, and the violation of
this Treaty by Japan's surprise attacks
on the United Kingdom on December
7, 1941, as the United Kingdom's rea-
son and ground for its declaration of
20. Ibid., page 1323.
21. See 21 AN1NUAIRE DE V'INSTITUT DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL-1906, 282.
22. Hershey, ThE ESSENTIALS Or INTERIATIOaAL
PUBLIC LAW AID ORGANIZATION (1939) 561.
23. Transcript, I.M.T.F.E., pages 11, 291.
24. Judgment, page 988.
25. 21 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DaDIT INE-
NATIONAL 1906, 275-277, 282, 293; 1 PROCEEDINGS
HAcuE PEACE CONrENCEs, Conference of 1907,
page 133. On "reasonable" rule applied to neu-
trals, see ibid., page 135.
26. Judgment, pages 987. 988.
27. Togo, op. cit., page 209.
28. Transcript, pages 11, 236-7.
29, Transcript, pages 34, 726.
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war. , 0 President Roosevelt gave sini.
lar grounds for the declaration of war
by the United States.
The declaration of war under Hague
III not only must be "previous" but it
also must be (2) an "explicit" warn-
ing declaration of war, not ambiguous
or uncertain. Obviously a note stating
that it terminates diplomatic talks falls
completely short of being an "explicit"
or "non 6quivoque" (French text of
Hague III) declaration of war. The
fact that the Japanese here again
evaded the treaty was stated by the
court. The court, however, did not ex-
pressly point out that in any event the
note was of no significance because it
was not a declaration of war. 31
The declaration of war must be (3)
a declaration of such a nature that it
is a "warning". "Warning" means, by
dictionary definition and as interpreted
by The Hague conference debates, 32
putting the receiving nation on guard;
informing it in clear and plain terms
that hostilities and war are about to
be commenced against it because of
the reasons stated, leaving open the
possibility that it can correct the stated
reasons without war. or at least per-
mitting it to notify its armed forces
of war. Obviously, Japan gave no
"warning" that it was going to make
an attack.
The declaration, finally, must be (4)
a "reasoned" declaration of war, stat-
ing the reasons why the attacking na-
tion is commencing war against the
nation to be attacked. The draftsmen
of Hague III at Ghent and at The
Hague, as Renault pointed out,"*3 be-
lieved that the nation about to be at-
tacked was entitled to receive such a
complaint or statement. 34 They be-
lieved also that the other nations of the
world were entitled to receive such a
statement of the reason or of the excuse
of the attacking nation for assuming
the vast and awful responsibility of
starting a war. The statement would
enable the other nations to judge where
the fault lay, to see whether they might
help to prevent war, and, if war com-
menced, to provide protection for their
own interests. The necessity of making
such a statement, the treaty-makers
believed, might also help to deter an
aggressor fromn making an unjustifiable
attack.3 5
In interpreting and applying Hague
III, lawyers and judges can well use
the established process of reference to
the background and legislativc history
of the law.
In Hague III there is man's instinct
of self-preservation against being killed
by stealthy surprise attack. There is the
common human revulsion against the
injustice and cowardice of murder by
a stab-in-the-back or by a bomb or a
nuclear missile dropped on unwarned
human beings in time o peace. This
instinct and this revulsion are chief
factors in the origin and the rugged-
ness of the treaty. The common sense
moreover of the people of the various
nations does not tolerate the idea of
mutual national or racial extermina-
tion by surprise war or by economic
ruin in armament races. The treaty
finds fundamental support also in the
people's faith in the rule of justice that
he who first attacks with the sword
shall perish by the sword.8 The legal
historian Pollock has observed that
"law is the sense of justice taking form
in people and races". The law of Hague
III may be said to be the sense of jus-
tice taking that form internationally in
the human race.
The law has been slow in taking
form. Grotius in the seventeenth cen-
tury stated his opinion that inter-
national law required a declaration of
war before commencing hostilities.3 t
The reason for this requirement, said
Grotius,
was not that they [the nations] might
do nothing secretly or by a clever trick,
for that consideration belongs rather to
the perfection of gallantry than to
law . . . but that it might appear with
certainty that the war was not waged
by private audacity, but by the will of
the peoples . . .
This reason for requiring a declara-
tion of war correctly recognizes the
fact that it is commonly a military dic-
tator's "private audacity" by which he
throws the people of his nation into
total war by his surprise attack on the
people of another nation. The opinion
of Grotius, however, that the prevail-
ing law at that time required a declara-
tion of war was not accepted by most
international lawyers. 38
Three centuries were to pass before
the opinion of Grotius became law by
the enactment of Hague III in 1907.
Lawyers and public leaders over many
years urged that the ages-old dispute
be settled by codification in a treaty
specifically requiring declaration of
war. An American lawyer, David Dud-
ley Field, included the provision in his
1872 draft code of international law,
which had a wide circulation in
Europe. 3
9
At the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Ghent, Belgium,
in September, 1906, a resolution was
proposed to state the wording and to
recommend the adoption of a treaty to
require a declaration of war. 4t The
debate on the resolution continued for
two days.
Renault, legal adviser of the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and like-
wise a judge of the Court of Arbitra-
tion, as chairman of the committee on
draft, explained "the essential terms of
the text". These terms, as explained by
Renault, were to become in the next
year the precise terms of Hague III;
and in 1948 they were to receive the
same interpretation at Tokyo.
Quoting the key words of the Reso-
lution, Renault explained each word,
as follows:
A warning [declaration of war] ex-
plicit-the reason for requiring a warn-
ing is to dispel uncertainty; a warning
previous-because if I stab a person
with a dagger, as a warning Lo him that
I am stabbing him it is useless to say
that I am stabbing him, because he
who is receiving the stab is feeling it.
The warning, however, is not neces-
sarily formalistic and uniform. . . Be-
cause the warning must be previous, it
follows that between the declaration of
war and the commencement of hostili-
ties, there must be a delay such that
this condition [of previous warning]
cannot become illusory.4 1 (Italics
added.)
30. Churchill, THE GRAND ALLIANCE (1950)
610.
S1. Judgment, page 976, 979, 986.
32- 1 PROCEEDINGS HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES,
1907, 131-133; 3 ibid. 160, 163.
33. 1 PEOCEEDINGs HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES,
1907, 131-136; 3 ibid. 159-170.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. See Charpeniier, Ot Va la Justice?, LA
REVUE DE PARIS (October, 1955, page 44); and
Toynbee, WAR AND CIVILIZArION (1950) 142.
37. Grotius, DE JUGE BELLI AC PACIS (1625).
38. Hershey, op. cit., page 559; Fenwick., op.
cit., page 552.
39. A NUAIRE DE L'INSTITVUT Du Dnor INTER-
NATIONAL-1906, pages 48, 53.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., pages 282-283.
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The next year, at the Second Peace
Conference at The Hague in 1907,
Russia proposed to the other powers
that provisions relative to the opening
of hostilities be codified. The Russians
considered that international law
should clearly forbid such an attack as
Japan had made on Russia in com-
mencing the Russo-Japanese war of
1904-05. Russia considered, moreover,
that a treaty law against surprise at-
tack was necessary also to reduce for
all nations the paralyzing costs of
armaments. The Russian delegate, Colo-
nel Michelson, forcefully argued this
point.
4 2
In the sessions of The Hague Con-
ference in 1907 and in the later rati-
fication discussions throughout the
world, the treaty received unique sup-
port by the nations and peoples of the
world. It was the general convention
among the thirteen conventions signed
at The Hague Conference of 1907 that
was unanimously signed or adhered
to,4 3 and that eventually received the
final approval of the largest number of
the forty-four participating nations. 44
It was the only general convention that
was approved without any reservations
whatsoevcr. 4
5
Even those who repeatedly violated
the treaty, namely Hitler and Tojo and
their associates, 46 did not seek to with-
draw from it. In view of the popular
support for the treaty in all nations,
and because of the incriminating na-
ture of a withdrawal, it appears to be
doubtful that any withdrawals will be
made. For the same reasons, it appears
to be reasonable to assume that sound
and simple legal proposals for strength-
ening or supplementing this treaty or
for redrafting it in a concise code,
with a few other universally denounced
crimes against public security, would
receive strong popular support.
II
The Court Having Jurisdiction:
The International Military
Tribunal for the Far East
A court of law, like a ship underway
or like an airplane in flight, is a place
where every person having duties is
held strictly personally responsible for
due performance of those duties. Cer-
tain legal duties were placed upon per-
sons and nations by Hague Convention
II1, as supplemented by the law of war.
No court of law, however, was estab-
lished during the period from 1907 to
1945 to hold personally responsible
any person who should violate those
legal duties. The treaty left any pro-
vision for a court to be made under
the law of war. Such provision was
only made at the end of World War 1I,
as described below.
Hague III during that period (1907-
19453 was violated by seventeen clear-
ly provable violations. The offenders,
like ordinary criminals, have sought to
belittle the law by pointing to the num-
ber and the enormity of the violations,
committed chiefly by themselves. Most
of the violations, however, were com-
mitted in only three years of that
thirty-eight year period, in 1939, 1940
and 1941. There were only two prin-
cipal offenders. And in the end they
brought only ruin and death to their
own countries and to themselves. The
importance of the violations of the
law, however, is indicated by the fact
that violations commenced both World
Wars.
Hitler and Germany committed seven
violations. The violations were in 1939
against Poland, in 1940 against The
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Denmark and Norway, and in 1941
against the Soviet Union.4 7 Tojo and
associates and Japan committed six
violations. The violations were in 1931,
1937, 1940 and 1941 against China,
and in 1941 against the United States
and Great Britain.48 There was also a
third offender. Stalin and the Soviet
Union committed two violations. The
violations were in 1939 against Poland
and against Finland.4 9
In 1914, German militarists and the
German Empire commenced the hostili-
ties of World War I by two violations.
These were against Belgium and Lux-
embourg. 50
42. 3 PROCEEDINGS HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES,
1907, 3, 159-170; 4 ibid. 131-135.
43. See note 3; Hershey, op. cit., page 561;
1 PROCEEDINGS HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, 698-
703, Table of Signatory States and Reservations;
and pages 599-690 Conventions and Final Act;
also Robinson, Hague Convention III and the
Tokyo War Crimes Indictmert, paper in PRO-
CEEDINGS, SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
TSE LEGAL PROFESSION, International Bar As-
sociation, The Hague, 1948.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. HItler, on December 14, 1941, commended
Oshima and Japan for using surprise attack at
Pearl Harbor. He said that his policy too was
not to "waste tine declaring war", but to strike
suddenly and without formality". See Harris,
There have been three other notori-
ous attacks without warning. They
were not surprise attacks in violation
of Hague Ill, however, because one or
both nations concerned were not par-
ties to Hague II. These attacks were
by Mussolini and Italy in 1935 against
Ethiopia, by Hitler and Germany in
1941 against Yugoslavia, and by Lee
Kwon Mu and other North Korean or
Chinese Communist attackers in 1950
against Korea.
No court was established in 1919 at
the end of World War I by the victori-
ous Allied Powers for the trial of Ger-
man leaders who had commenced the
war in 1914 by violating Hague III
and other treaties. The Allies, instead
of simply setting up military or treaty
courts or commissions to apply Hague
III and other treaties to German indi-
viduals who had admittedly violated
them, made a legal muddle of the
criminal law situation. 1 Evasion of
responsibility and playing of politics
or policy by some Allied leaders caused
the legal adviser to the American
Peace Commission at Versailles in 1919
to describe the failure to prosecute the
chief German leader as a game of
"passing the buck"! 52
At the end of World War II in 1945
there were many cynical predictions
that history would repeat itself. It was
asserted that again no court would be
established to bring the criminal vio-
lators of Hague III and other treaties
to justice. The American people, how-
ever, the Congress and the press, and
the people of Great Britain, of China
and of other nations, were demanding
legal prosecutions. Governmental pol-
icy, moreover, as shown by the Pots-
dam Declaration of July 26, 1945,
promised the joint prosecution of "ir-
responsible militarism" in Japan and
for establishing peace and international
law in the Pacific areas.5 3
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(1954), page 171; and at page 225: "To Hitler,
the success of any military action depended in
large part upon the factor of surprise. All of
his invasions were undeclared".
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In regard to the necessity for courts,
the nations had permitted the situation
to develop into an emergency, and the
armed services were required to meet
the emergency. Fortunately, the par-
ticipation by the American Armed
Services in the war crimes trials in the
Pacific areas became a direct responsi-
bility of certain able officials, and espe-
cially of a Secretary of the Navy and
of a General of the Army who were
supremely capable, hard-working, con-
scientious and uncompromising Amer-
icans. To these two leaders the crucial
and immediate responsibility of help-
ing to provide fair trials for Japanese
war crimes cases was both a trust and
a challenge.
Secretary of the Navy James For-
restal on January 15, 1945, in an-
nouncing to the Navy the establishment
of the national War Crimes office by
the State, War and Navy Depart-
ments, 54 stated that
Enemy persons who commit murders,
atrocities, and other violations of the
laws of war against members of the
armed forces of the United States or
against other Americans
are to be brought to trial on evidence
collected, and under "arrangements for
trial" prepared, by the War Crimes
office.
The requirement that "trials be ar-
ranged" necessarily involved establish-
ment of trial courts of law. The require-
ulent that he trials be los "violations
of the laws of war" meant that under
Navy authority no Japanese would be
tried for an act not defined and pro-
hibited specifically as a crime by a
treaty law or laws, or for an ex post
facto offense. "The laws of war" of
course included Hague III of 1907;
and Hague III clearly imposed on
Japanese Government leaders the duty
not to plan and direct surprise attacks
against the armed forces and people of
other nations that were parties to that
treaty agreement.
The alternative to a treaty court
system was a military court system.
But who would establish such courts
in the Pacific areas? The questions
persisted: Will the war crimes fiasco
of 1919 make a repeat performance in
1945? Will courts of law again not be
established to bring to justice the vio-
lators of Hague III and of other laws
Scene at the Tokyo Trials on judgment day just prior to the reading
of the verdicts.
for the prevention or control of war?
A clear, straight answer to these
questions came in September, 1945.
The answer came in the Pacific area
from the General of the Army.
"I do not propose to pass the buck!"
were decisive words in the answer.
The speaker, tall and thin, in khaki
summer uniform, was sitting on a worn
divan in a large, barracks-like room
in the Customs Building, Yokohama,
Japan. The day was September 12,
1945, ten days after the Japanese had
signed the instrument of surrender.
The room was part of the speaker's ad-
vance headquarters as Commander-in-
Chief, United States Army Forces
Pacific, and as Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers in the Pacific.
The speaker's khaki shirt was open at
the collar. On the collar was a circle
of five stars. He was speaking slowly
and in a clear, raised voice; his
shoulders and his hands, sometimes
holding his well-known underslung
pipe, moved in emphatic gestures as he
spoke.
The circle of Army and Navy offi-
cers to whom General MacArthur was
speaking included the Chief of Staff
and three other officers of his head-
quarters staff. There were also four
officers, two Navy and two Army, who
were a team from the U. S. War Crimes
Office at Washington. They had arrived
that day after being at Pearl Harbor,
at Guam and at Manila, where they had
likewise executed their orders to "offer
to Pacific commanders any assistance
desired in war crimes matters."
"I received today", the General was
saying, (as I heard and recorded his
words), "a radiogram from Washing-
ton which you have seen. It directs me
to proceed to arrange trials of war
criminals. . . The Trials must be con-
ducted in the full light of publicity.
They must be lair and free from
vengeance or politics. They must be
examples to the world of law and jus-
tice. We shall be criticized but we shall
strive for the verdict of history."
At long last Hague III was going to
have a court and a hearing. The treaty
was therefore to be law in the true legal
sense as defined in an opinion of the
U. S. Supreme Court (Holmes, J.) as
follows:
Law is a statement of the circum-
stances in which the public force will
be brought to bear upon men through
the courts.55
The "public force" of law, specifically
Hague III, was going to be "brought
to bear upon men through the courts."
Other treaties and charges and courts
also were to receive due attention.
54. NAVY DEPARTMENT BULLETIN, January 15,
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